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COMMENTS
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION-THE PSYCHIATRIC
INDICATION-A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?*
Very few issues, no matter how controversial, have evoked
such instant, vociferous and irreconcilable furor as has the issue
of liberalization of present abortion statutes. Perhaps that is as it
should be, since this topic touches so many aspects of our lives.
Abortion is, however, a basic problem of the sanctity of human
life' and of man's inviolate right to be born once conceived, which2
traces its beginnings into antiquity. The Hammurabian Code,
promulgated in 1728 B.C., contained specific provisions forbidding
abortion.3 The controversy has raged unabated over the succeeding
centuries.
The basic Christian position on the termination of pregnancy
was a conscious judgment based on the three-stage Aristotelian
theory of embryology. Aristotle taught that the development of
human life consisted of three stages-the vegetable, the animal,
and the rational. Life was not created at any one point in time,
but progressed by stages beginning from an original potentiality.
A purely vegetative life began at conception. 4 At a later time
animal life was added and rational life attached just prior to birth
of the fetus.
The writings of St. Thomas Acquinas somewhat changed the
Aristotelian theory. Acquinas thought that the rational soul was
* Any statements of fact or medical opinion in text or footnotes not
attributed to cited authority are based upon the author's experience as a
physician. The views expressed in this Comment are to be attributed to
its author.
1. 36 A.L.I. PROCiEEDINcS 252 (1959)(comment by Professor Schwartz).
2. GoTZE TRANSL., THE HITTITE LAWS, in. ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TExTs
196 (2d ed. Pritchard 1955).
3. The writer is struck by a seeming paradox of the ages: the age of
Hammurabi with the code of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"
and prohibitions against abortion. Our twentieth century criminal laws
with such emphasis upon the sacredness of life and its inviolability that
many learned and wise voices cry for abolition of the death penalty so that
no one is sacrificed by mistake of our legal system. Yet in our vast sophistication many of these same advocates preach necessity of abortion on
demand as "the final freedom." The precious right to life of one accused,
tried, convicted, with rights of appeal versus the total abrogation of that
right to life against one charged with no crime, tried by no jury, given no
right to counsel, and no right to appeal his sentence.
4. This seems a highly significant observation. He definitely considered that it was a life at this stage.
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not infused into the body until the fertilized ovum had reached a
certain stage of development of the intra-uterine material. Following Aristotle's three-stage theory, however, the Church came
to consider abortion as murder if performed later than forty days
following conception for a male and eighty days for a female. 5
The emphasis in the teachings of the ancients on presence and
timing of the soul's entry is significant since they equated the
soul with the humanizing factor.
The principle of "quickening" entered the common law via
Bracton: 7 "If there be someone, who has struck a pregnant woman, or has given her poison, whereby he has caused abortion, if
the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if it
be animated, he commits homicide."" Bracton's comments have had
a marked effect on subsequent abortion laws. Whether the statute expressly makes abortion a crime only after the infant in
utero is quick 9 or simply alludes to this criterion as one of the reliable indicators of humanity, 10 the impact of Bracton's thought is
evident.
The basic position of the Church remained one of prohibition
of abortion at any time after animation-Aristotle's second stage
of development of life. In 1869, Pope Pius IX eliminated all distinctions between animation and non-animation." The Church would
consider all abortion as murder. This shift in theologic viewpoint
was stimulated by new embryologic concepts. The human spermatazoa was discovered in 1677 by microscopic study and in 1853
embryologists discovered that the male sperm penetrates the female ovum to produce fertilization. The Church's position has remained steadfastly unchanged for one hundred years. This shift
in Roman Catholic theology created the irreconcilable conflict
which rages even today.
This then is a statement of the problem facing state legislatures as they embark on the difficult task of charting a course
through this highly controversial area. What is the magnitude
of the problem of illegal abortion? Before rewriting existing
5. L. LADER, ABORTION 77 (1966).
It is not clear why the difference
in sex established different times or how the fetal sex was to be determined.
6. J. WILLSON, C. BEECHAM, I. FORMAN, & E. CARRINGTON, OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 201 (1958). This term indicates the perception of fetal motion by the mother. Multiparas first feel the infant about 4 months and
4 days and primagravidas about 4 months and 14 days after the first day
of the last menstrual period.

7.

2

BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETuDINiBus ANGLIAE

(Twiss

ed.

1879).

8. Id. at 279.
9. See ARK. STAT. ArN. § 41-2223 (1947).
10. See MODEL PENAL CODE Comment 1, at 149 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
11.

NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION

405 (1965).
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legislation in so polemic an area, the inadequacy of present laws
should be clearly demonstrated. Here again there is a veritable
sea of controversy. Many writers, both in books12 on the subject and in law review articles, 13 consistently state figures in the
range of one to one and one-half million illegal abortions performed per year with an estimated maternal mortality of five to
ten thousand. These figures are little more than an educated guess
because illegal abortion is a clandestine event and the illegal abortionist does not publish statistics to vouch for his skill and
asepsis. The figures have not been without their critics. Perhaps
the most notable critic is Dr. Alex Barno, who conducted a statistical analysis of criminal abortion deaths in Minnesota from 1950
to 1965.14 During that period there were 1,301,745 live births in
Minnesota for an average of 80,000 per year. The same period
yielded an average of 4,000,000 live births per year in the United
States. The statistics show that Minnesota contributed 1/50 of the
total national births per year. Minnesota, then, should have 100 to
200 criminal abortion deaths per year on a statistical basis. Instead there were a total of 21 criminal abortion deaths in the
sixteen years or an average of 1.3 per year.15 That some percentage
of deaths from criminal abortions was missed in the study is certainly possible. But is it possible that 99 or 198 criminal abortion
deaths were missed? The inference drawn from the study would
be that our criminal abortion death statistics have been grossly
exaggerated. The only other possibility is that the skill and asepsis of the abortionist has been greatly underestimated. The former
conclusion is assuredly the more tenable of the two. The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code estimate criminal abortions in the
United States as ranging from 333,000 to 2,000,000 per year. 16
A variability of 1,667,000 criminal abortions per year in a total
possible of 2,000,000 tends to generate a sense of skepticism when
emotional cries of the magnitude of the problem are heard. Certainly even one death from criminal abortion presents a serious
problem, but these seemingly overwhelming figures of the enormity of the problem generate considerable emotional impact and
perhaps tend to lessen the painstakingly analytic approach required for legislation in this area.
LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION

Regulation of abortion rests largely within the statutory sphere.
In the past the legislators have defined the meaning of the term
12. See L.
13.

LADER, supra note 5, at 2.
See Z. Leavy & J. Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failureof Law,

50 A.B.A.J. 52 (1964); 12 W. RES. L. REV. 74, 84 (1960).
14. A. Barno, Criminal Abortion Deaths, Illegitimate Pregnancy
Deaths, and Suicides in Pregnancy-Minnesota 1950-1965, 98 Am. J. OBSTETRICS

15.
16.

&

GYNECOLOGY

356 (1967).

Id. at 357.
MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 207.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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and the possible exceptions applicable to its enforcement. With
one notable exception,17 the common law has had little or no place
in the evolution and refinement of the present state of the law.
Statutory enactments may be roughly divided into two categories:
those which prohibit the performance of abortion without codified
exception and those which allow abortion under certain well-circumscribed conditions.
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania state
no exceptions to their overall prohibition.1 8 Massachusetts, however, has ameliorated the strict provisions of the statute by judicial
decision, saying that the physician may perform an abortion if
there is great peril to the life or health of the woman. The
physician, however, acts at his peril. Subjective belief in the necessity of his procedure will not suffice. The standard of necessity is an objective one and the physician's judgment must correspond "with the average judgment of the doctors in the community
in which he practices." 9 New Jersey has by decision apparently
sanctioned the procedure to save life. 20 Statutory law in New
Hampshire and South Carolina is in a state of internal disarray.
The sections prohibiting attempted abortion provide no specific
exceptions. 21 The corresponding sections which penalize actual
abortion allow as justifications those acts seemingly necessary to
preserve the life of the mother.2 2 All other jurisdictions have specific legislation allowing certain exceptions to the general prohibition. The exception common to all these statutes is an abortion
to save the life of the mother, but there are wide differences in
2approach. Eleven jurisdictions require a physician or surgeon
to perform the permitted abortion, while thirty-one states unbe24
lievably seem to allow anyone to perform the procedure.
17. Rex v. Bourne, [1938] 3 All E.R. 615. See discussion in text
accompanying note 38 infra.
18. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87 (Supp. 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, § 19 (1956); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. f.it.

i8,§ 4718 (1963).
19. Commonwealth v.Brunelle, 341
(1961).
20. See State v.Brandenburg, 137
1948).
21. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:12
(1962).
22. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13

Mass. 675, 677, 171 N.E.2d 850, 852
N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (Sup. Ct.
(1955); S.C.

CODE ANN.

§

16-83

(1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82

(1962).
23. ARK.STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-23
(1964); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1
(Smith-Hurd 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 2223 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-

5-1,-3 (1964); N.Y. PEN.LAW §§ 80-81, N.Y. REV. PEN.LAw §§ 125.05,125.40.55 (1959); OnE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1964); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04
(1958).
24. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-211 (1956); CONN.

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 53-29
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A critical area of interpretation is the test to be used to
determine necessity of the procedure. Should the objective reasonable man standard be established or is the good faith subjective
belief of the performer enough? Thirty states indicate an objective necessity.2 5

Among these jurisdictions, however, despite the

objective wording of the statutes, five courts have26 by judicial fiat
construed them to allow good faith belief to suffice.
Allocation of the burden of proof, whether by statute or judicial decision, has had a further ameliorating affect on the strict
wording of the statutes. Michigan, by statute, relieves the state
from the obligation to prove lack of necessity.27 Illinois accomplishes essentially the same result by stating that the issue of necessity is an affirmative defense. 28 Otherwise the matter has been
left to judicial interpretation. Only two courts have said that the
burden of proof is on the defendant,2 9 but in fifteen other jurisdictions the state must plead and prove lack of necessity.3 0
(1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301 (1953); HAWAI REV. LAWS §§ 309-3,-4
(1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-601 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.020 (1959); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 51 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1949); NEB.
REV. STAT. §3 28-404, -405 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §3 14-44 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-01 (1943); OHIO REV.
CODE § 2901.16 (1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (Supp. 1964); R.I.
GEN. LAW ANN. § 11-3-1 (1957); S.C. Code ANN. § 16-82 (1962); S.D. CODE
§ 13.3101 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (1955); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN.
art. 1191 (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 101 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-62 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010
(1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5923 (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-77 (1959).
25. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1962);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-211 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (1952); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 301 (1953);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (SmithHurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-105 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.1
(1950); KY. REV. STAT. § 436.020 (1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 51 (1965); McH. STAT. ANN. § 28.204 (1962);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1949); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963); N.Y.
PEN. LAW §§ 80-81, N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW §§ 125.05, 125.40-.55 (1959); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-25-10 (1943); OKLA. STAT.
AN. tit. 21, § 861 (Supp. 1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1964); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-3-1 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962); S.D. CODE
§ 13.3101 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 101 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1956); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-77
(1959).
26. See Steed v. State, 27 Ala. App. 263, 170 So. 489 (1936); People
v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959); Honnard v. People,
77 Ill. 481 (1875); State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928);
State v. Elliott, 234 Ore. 522, 383 P.2d 382 (1963).
27. MICH. STAT.ANN.§ 28.204 (1962).
28. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1963).
29. See Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Fitch
v. People, 45 Colo. 298, 100 Pac. 1132 (1909).
30. See People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953); State v.
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Must the performer consult with other physicians before he
can claim the requisite statutory necessity? Thirteen states require consultation under their statutes.3 1 Three others penalize
failure to consult by license revocation.3 2 In other jurisdictions the
presence or absence of consultation presumably plays no part in
the legality of the procedure. In a practical sense, however, it will
almost always determine whether the physician is prosecuted.
Seven states permit abortion to preserve the life of the unborn child,33 probably because of a confusion in terminology. The
obvious legislative intent would seem to be to exclude induced
labor from the prohibitions of the statute. In the medical sense,
induced labor is not at all an abortion but a procedure for any one
of a myriad of medical indications.
A few states have expanded their statutory exceptions to include prevention of serious and permanent bodily injury,3 4 or to
protect the health of the mother.3 5 Oregon with "health in peril"3 6
and Maryland with "satisfied .

.

. that no other method will

secure the safety of the mother"37 might also be included in this
group.
To discuss the development, refinement and interpretation of
the law concerning therapeutic abortion is impossible without
mention of the impact of Rex v. Bourne.38 For the first time a
common law court made an in-depth analysis of the meaning of the
words "life and health of the mother." Unlike most American state
Lee, 69 Conn. 186, 37 A. 75 (1897); State v. Brown, 26 Del. 499, 85 A. 797
(1912); Holloway v. State, 90 Ga. App. 86, 82 S.E.2d 235 (1954); State v.
Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592 (1928); Commonwealth v. Stone,
300 Mass. 160, 14 N.E.2d 158 (1938); Ladnier v. State, 155 Miss. 348, 124 So.
432 (1929); State v. DeGroat, 259 Mo. 364, 168 S.W. 702 (1914); People v.
Harrison, 40 Misc. 2d 601, 243 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Moody v. State,
17 Ohio St. 110 (1866); State v. Elliott, 206 Ore. 82, 289 P.2d 1075 (1955);
State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513 (1947); State v. Wells, 35 Utah
400, 100 P. 681 (1909); State v. Montifoire, 95 Vt. 508, 116 A. 77 (1921);
State v.Bates, 52 Wash. 2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1964); FLA. STAT.

ANN. §§ 782.10, 797.01
§§ 26-1101, 1103 (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
31-410 (Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957); Miss. CODE ANNi.
§ 2223 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404,

31.

(1965);

GA. CODE ANN.

-405 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1,
-3 (1964); Omo REV. CODE § 2901.16 (1957); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1191

(1961); Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958).
ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 270 (Supp. 1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285
(1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1963).
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-29 (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18
(1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1963);
N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 80-81, N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW §§ 125.05, 125.40-.55 (1959);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1956).

32.

34. N.M.STAT. ANN.§§40 A-5-1, -3 (1964).
35. ALA. CODE tit. 14. § 9 (1959); D.C. CODE ANN.
36. ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.060 (1964).
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 3 (1957).

38.

[1938] 3 All E.R. 615.

§ 22-201

(1961).
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laws, the then existing law in England simply prohibited "unlawful
abortion." No prior court had defined that term. Dr. Bourne contended that an abortion could be lawfully performed to preserve
mental health as well as to save life. Justice MacNaghten made
two salient points in his jury instruction: (1) life depends on
health; and (2) it may be that if health is gravely impaired,
"death" results. "Only the physician has the responsibility of
deciding this danger." 39 "The law is not that the doctor has got to
wait until this unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death
and then at the last moment, if successful, snatch her from the
'40
jaws of death.
If in light of this instruction the jury believed that bearing
this child of an act of assault would make the girl a physical or
mental wreck, then it could rightfully decree that Dr. Bourne had
operated for the purpose of preserving the life of the child. The
jury reached a verdict of not guilty. Precedent was then apparently established for giving a sweeping definition to the term
"preservation of life." If health is menaced by threat of pregnancy, then life itself may be threatened.
RECENT STATUTORY ENACTMENTS

Twenty-nine years and untold volumes of debate after the
Bourne decision, three jurisdictions have by statute significantly
broadened the criteria for therapeutic abortion. All three states
incorporated to some extent the nucleus of the provisions in the
Model Penal Code. 4' California would allow abortion if: (1) there
is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother, or (2) the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 42 The term "mental
health" means mental illness to the extent that the woman is
dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others, or is
in need of supervision or restraint. 43 The California enactment
makes clear that no wide departure from traditional psychiatric
39.

40.
41.

Id. at 620.

Id. at 618.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminating a

pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother, or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental de-

fect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious
intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall be
deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. Justifiable abortions
shall be performed only in a licensed hospital except in case of emergency
when hospital facilities are unavailable. [Additional exceptions from the
requirement of hospitalization may be incorporated here to take account of
situations in sparsely settled areas where hospitals are not generally ac-

cessible.]
42.
43.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 25951 (1967).
§ 25954 (1967).
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indications for performance of a therapeutic abortion will be allowed. The term "dangerous to self or others" obviously connotes
the traditional severe psychiatric illnesses. The other psychiatric
allowance, for patients "in need of supervision or restraint," again
is simply a statutory embodiment of traditional psychiatric teaching. California stands notably silent, however, on eugenic considerations as indications for allowance of a therapeutic abortion.4
Colorado allows performance of a therapeutic abortion if:
(1) the pregnancy would result in death of the mother or
serious, permanent impairment of her physical or
mental health;
(2) the child would likely be born with grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation;
(3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible rape or incest
and no more than 16 weeks of gestation had passed;
16 became pregnant from statutory rape
(4) girls under
45
or incest.

The Colorado statute embodies all the essential provisions of the
Model Penal Code. Under the eugenic criteria, the Colorado statute
allows an abortion if the child would likely be born with grave and
permanent physical deformity or mental retardation, while the
Model Penal Code simply says would be born with grave physical
or mental defect. One can only surmise whether the Colorado legislature was consciously lowering the quantum of 40proof requisite
to bring the physician within the statute's protection.
The North Carolina statute provides that abortion is lawful if:
(1) there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the
health of the woman;
(2) there is substantial risk that the child would be born
with grave physical or mental defect;
(3) the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest and the
said alleged rape was reported to a law-enforcement
agency or court official within seven days after the
4
alleged rape.

7

These abortion statutes represent the first American steps to
expand lawful indications for therapeutic abortion. The CaliforCompare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (1967) with MODEL
CODE § 230.3(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 to 52 (1967).
46. The quantum of proof needed to support performance of a therapeutic abortion on grounds that the child would likely be born with a
grave defect seems to be less than that required to support a therapeutic
abortion on grounds that the child would be born with a grave defect.
Considering that statutory language is precisely drawn and that the Colorado legislature probably had the Model Penal Code before them, their
addition of the word likely may well reflect a conscious lessening of the
quantum of proof.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.45-1 (1967).
44.

PENAL
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nia and Colorado statutes explicitly sanction abortion on grounds
of mental health. 48 The North Carolina statute is silent on
mental health, but follows the other criteria listed in the Model
Penal Code.
Statutory authority in at least two jurisdictions now expressly
permits the courts to probe the mental health of the proposed
abortee. The Bourne court reached the same result through
judicial analysis. But should an analysis of the mental health of
the proposed abortee only consider the impact of a denial of the
"therapeutic effect of the curette?" What of the converse? What
is the effect upon the psyche of the woman allowed an abortion?
CURRENT

TRENDS IN

INDICATIONS FOR THERAPEUTIC ABORTION

A characteristic list of contraindications to pregnancy and
hence indications for therapeutic abortion in 1935 would have read
something like this:
1. recent pelvic surgery
2. benign pelvic neoplasms
3. malignant disease of the pelvis
4. developmental defects in the mother
5. too frequent and poorly spaced pregnancies
6. diseases of the skin
7. diseases of the blood
8. diseases of the kidney
9. diseases of the lung
10. diseases of the heart
11. mental disease
12. eugenic grounds
13. diseases of the nervous system
14. metabolic disturbances
15. toxemias of pregnancy
16. diseases of the ear
17. diseases of the eye
18. and a grand finale of miscellaneous.
Although some of these indications can be considered as little
more than laughable even by 1935 standards, many of them indicate an inability at that time to cope with concurrent disease in
pregnancy. Perhaps there was also a different attitude concerning the impact of pregnancy on maternal physiology. The obstetrician of yesteryear, performing without benefit of blood,
antibiotics and open heart surgery, was more prone to recognize
and maximize the altered physiology of pregnancy. Perhaps it
was only natural for him to avoid foreseeable complications by
performing a therapeutic abortion. Yet to perform a therapeutic
abortion is to accept defeat at the hands of a medical or psychiatric malady. It is surely the poorest of all possible solutions. But
48.

California does, however, place a rather restrictive connotation

on the term "mental health." See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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the past thirty years have seen one criterion after another for
therapeutic abortion fall before the advances of modern medicine.
Specialists in every field have emphasized, with reference to her
complicating disease, that the pregnant woman is little different
from the non-pregnant. Obstetricians now teach that, with reference to the pregnancy, the woman with a medical complication is
much the same as other gravida. Statistics best illustrate the
dramatic decline in medical indications for therapeutic abortion.
An exhaustive study49 was conducted on the incidence and indications for therapeutic abortion which included questionnaire returns
from 171 hospitals chosen for geographic locale, number of deliveries, and presence of internship and residency programs. The
study was divided into two five year periods, 1941-45 and 1946-50.
The total number of deliveries studied in the series was over three
million. The hospitals were divided into two groups: those performing therapeutic abortion when medically indicated during pregnancy and those not performing therapeutic abortion. The results
were as follows:50
Table II Maternal Mortality
No Therapeutic Abortion
Therapeutic Abortion
Years
Deaths
Deliveries
Rate/l,000
Deaths
Deliveries
Rate/l,00O
41-45
827
642,788
1.28
971
599,685
1.61
46-50
642
1.038,201
0.61
587
975.032
0.61
Total
1469
1,680,989
0.87
1558
1,574,717
0.98
(Totals Both Groups--Both Periods)
Deaths 3027
Deliveries 3,255,706
Rate 0.93

The results of this study are striking. They rather conclusively
demonstrate that therapeutic abortion has no affect on maternal
survival rates. Although the statistical results of the two groups
are markedly similar, the group of hospitals not performing therapeutic abortions during pregnancy had a slightly lower ma-"
ternal mortality than the other group. Cosgrove51 noted that Chicago Lying-In Hospital with a ratio of one therapeutic abortion
per 195 deliveries and Johns Hopkins Hospital with a ratio of one
therapeutic abortion per 35 deliveries were not able to improve on
the maternal mortality of the Margaret Hague Hospital, which
performed only one abortion per 16,750 deliveries.
Armed with these impressive statistics, the reader should
conclude that the over-all incidence of therapeutic abortion has
decreased almost to the vanishing point. Although that supposition is inescapably logical, a survey of current medical literature
does not confirm it. A subtle though perceptible change has
occurred in the list of indications for therapeutic abortions. Concomitantly with the remarkable decrease in medical indications for
49. R. Heffernan & W. Lynch, What is the Status of Therapeutic Abortion in Modern Obstetrics?, 66 Amw. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 335 (1953).
50. Id. at 336.
51. S. Cosgrove, A Consideration of Therapeutic Abortion, 48 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 299 (1944).
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therapeutic abortion has come an equally remarkable increase in
psychiatric indications. The percentage of abortions now performed on the basis of psychiatric indications ranges from 61% in
Gold's series 52 in New York City to 85% in Niswander's series's in
Buffalo. What factor stimulated this rapid rise of the psychiatric
indication as the most common reason for therapeutic abortion?
Perhaps there is no one certain answer. Several theories would,
however, lend some measure of explanation for this phenomenon.
Perhaps psychiatry as an independent medical discipline has not
kept pace with the forward rush of medicine. This hardly seems
so. Few other specialties in medicine have risen so rapidly to
take their place as recognized and important disciplines. With a
more perfect realization of the effect of man's mind on his bodily
functioning has come the correlative realization that this specialty has much to offer society. There is another possibilitymuch more likely and much more repugnant. Dr. Sidney Bolter
calls it "the unwitting accomplice." 54 He feels that doctors are
recognizing an easy way out of the dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy. Psychiatry lends itself readily to rather vague disease
classifications and indications for therapeutic abortion because
of the "elasticity of psychoanalytic considerations." 55 The psychiatrist might also misinterpret the individual's psychic needs.
Since prior to the Model Penal Code and the three liberal state
statutes the only psychiatric indication for therapeutic abortion
was threat of suicide, one would expect that therapeutic abortion is
often recommended to avert the possibility of a gravida taking her
life. Figures again tell the opposite story. Various studies have
shown that suicide in pregnancy is rare. The rate of occurrence is
0 to 0.2% per 100,000 population as compared to 3.1 to 5.2% per
100,000 population for all females.56 A 1963 study5 7 followed up
249 women who were refused legal abortion in 1948 and discovered
that 86% had successfully delivered, 11% had been illegally aborted,
and 3% had spontaneously aborted. There were no suicides in
this series even though seven of the women had attempted sucide
when not pregnant. Another study 58 of 304 woman whose requests
for therapeutic abortion were refused found no suicides even
though 62 of these patients had indicated that they would take
52. E. Gold, E. Erhardt, H. Jacobziner, & F. Nelson, Therapeutic Abortions in New York City: A 20 Year Review, 55 AM. J. PuBLIc HEALTH 964
(1955).
53. K. Niswander, M. Klein, & C. Randall, Changing Attitudes Toward
TherapeuticAbortion, 28 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 124 (1966).
54. S. Bolter, The Psychiatrist's Role in Therapeutic Abortion: The
Unwitting Accomplice, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 312 (1962).
55. Id.
56. A. Barno, supra note 14, at 360.
57. K. Hook, Refused Abortion, 39 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA ET NEUROLOGICA
SCANDINIVICA 168 (Supp. 1963).
58. B. Lindberg, A Follow-Up Study of 304 Women Who Were Refused Therapeutic Abortion, 45 SvuNsKA LAK.-TIDN. 1381 (1948).
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their lives if refused abortion. Perhaps, in light of the statistics,
the fetus in utero acts in reality as a protective mechanism. Perhaps the mother is more reticent to take two lives than one. If
there is little or no threat of suicide, then what are the reasons
for recommending therapeutic abortion on psychiatric grounds?
Psychiatrists all too often allude to the nebulous arena of "unhappiness in the gravida" or other emotional or psychic trauma.
SHOULD WE BALANCE?
Professor Schwartz" stated that the core of the therapeutic
abortion problem centers on individual concepts of the sanctity of
life. He did not say that it centered on the individual's views as
to presence or absence of life, but rather its sanctity. This thought
presupposes the existence of life. Much has been written pro and
con on the inviolability of human life. The Catholic Church has
been called medieval, sanctimonious, obstructionist and cruel. Proponents of liberal abortion laws have been called hedonistic,
morally bankrupt and even murderers. Is there no middle ground
between these equally vociferous extremes? Some proponents of
liberalization of existing abortion statutes advocate a balancing of
the mother's interests against those of the fetus by taking into
account all possible ramifications, including sociological, medical,
monetary and those affecting the community at large.60 Despite
the Catholic Church's unalterable opposition to any balancing of
rights, perhaps in the final analysis the decision to abort will be
subject to this process. Like most other things in life and in the
law, compromise often offers the most workable solution to highly
complex problems."1 From a medical point of view, however, much
criticism can be leveled at proponents of liberalization. The
Hippocratic Oath states:
I will not give a fatal draught to anyone even if asked,
nor will I suggest any such thing. Neither will I give a
Whenever I
woman a pessary to procure an abortion. ...
go into a house I will go to help the sick and never with
I will use my
the intention of doing harm or injury ....
power to help the sick to the best of my ability and judgment and 62I will abstain from wrongdoing or harming any
man by it.
Although some members of the profession have called this a sanc59. See note 1 supra.
60. T. Barnard, An Analysis and Criticism of the Model Penal Code
Provisionson the Law of Abortion, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 540, 556 (1967).
61. It is not this writer's intention to delve into a theological analysis
of the Roman Catholic position on this point. A most absorbing and analytical discussion of this position appears in G. KELLY S.J., MDIco-MoAL

PROBLEMS (1958).
62.

1952).

HIPPOCRATES ON INTERCOURSE AND PREGNANCY

(T. Ellinger transl.
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timonious statement, 63 no one doubts that it sets a noble course
for a noble profession. The heritage and tradition of medicine
speaks only of care and concern for the saving and maintenance of
life. Death, while a constant companion, is the dreaded enemy of
the physician. It is a defeat when a physician loses a patient to
this enemy. Must it not be doubly distasteful when the physician
becomes the active instrument of destruction of life? What is
the impact of modern embryological thinking? Here, too, there is
little solace to offer advocates of a liberal policy.
Modern science regards the embryo as a human being
from the moment that the male spermatazoa fertilizes
the female ovum to form the zygote.
Fertilization produces a new life. The ancient theory
that the embryo is pars viscerum matris has been discredited and it is now accepted that the new embryonic life is
an independent functioning organism. Of course, the embryo depends upon the mother for nutriment and an environment conducive to growth, but so does the suckling
babe.
We have also rejected the theory that the embryo
passes through a subhuman stage in the womb. From the
moment of zygote formation, the characteristics of a highly
individuated human organism are established by the intermixture and combination of the genes, chromosomes
and cytoplasm contributed by the parental human egg and
sperm. This includes not only sex but a whole spectrum of
human traits, both external and internal, organic and
functional ....

For the geneticist the individuality of the

adult is the unfolding of the unknown, as well the yet to be
identified genetic determinants within the fertilized egg
which give it the essential individuality that subsequently
marks the adult. The lay person should be readily able to
see that as we project the adult from the given newborn,
so the infant (and subsequently the adult) is primarily a
projection of the individualized human being, the fertilized egg. This new, and individualized human life starts
to grow immediately, and after several days, begins to implant itself in the womb. The implantation process is not
significant vis-A-vis the embryo's
humanity. A bird, in or
64
out of the nest, is still a bird.
The same could be said of other phenomena such as quickening and
birth. They add nothing to the humanity of the conceptus, but
are merely functional transitions from one type and mode of existence to another.
This concept of embryological development, however, is at
distinct odds with the philosophy of the Model Penal Code. The
Code writers were surely disturbed by the possible argument that
63. See A. Guttmacher, Therapeutic Abortion in a Large General

Hospital, 37

SURGICAL CLINICS OF

No.

AM.

459 (1957).

64. R. Byrn, The Abortion Question: A Non-Sectarian Approach, 11
CATHOLIc LAwYER 317-18 (1965).
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they were approving the direct taking of a life, and they made a
rather feeble and unscientific attempt to refute this argument:
As to the homocidal aspects of abortion, the answer of
those who would favor liberalization would be as follows:
most abortions-those which occur naturally as well as
induced abortions-occur prior to the fourth month of
pregnancy before the fetus becomes firmly implanted in
the womb, before it develops many of the characteristic
and recognizable features of humanity, and well before it is
capable of those movements which when felt by the
mother are called quickening.
There seems to be an obvious difference between terminating the development of such an inchoate being,
whose chance of maturing is still somewhat problematical, and, on the other hand, destroying a fully formed viable fetus of eight months, where the offense might well
become ordinary murder if the child should happen to
survive for a moment after it has been expelled from the
body of its mother. 5
This passage is replete with medical inaccuracies and erroneous
conclusions drawn from standard medical facts. First, implantation occurs in the womb within two weeks of fertilization. This
must occur for the newly formed conceptus to survive. Second, the
fetus, even if viewed by a layman, has developed all features characteristic and recognizable as human by the seventh week of its
existence.
Although the head remains relatively enormous during the embryonic period, the rest of the body takes form
after the fourth week and the head becomes smaller in
proportion. By the seventh week after conception the neck
can be recognized and the tail filament has disappeared;
now the embryo can be easily recognized as human. 6
The Model Penal Code speaks of the tiny embryo as inchoate, but
only a2-relative term. Is not the infant two hours old,
inchoate
..A y is ^''
d, ,and even two years old still relatively inchoate?
two dy
Has he reached full potentiality?
Assuming arguendo that one will accept certain criteria as
valid indications for performance of a therapeutic abortion, then
one has decided to perform a moral balancing act. Now the
fetus' right to life is consciously weighed against the interests 6of7
the mother, her family, and even the community at large.
Should this balancing act necessarily stop at the introitus? Should
the right to balance be delineated only by the thickness of the
uterine wall?
If it is assumed that balancing one life against another is
medically and morally justifiable, what shall be the criteria?
Comment 1, at 149 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

65.

MODEL PENAL CODE

66.
67.

J. WnLuLvs, OBsTERnucs 138 (1961).
T. Barnard, supra note 60.
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Remembering that abortion is the intentional destruction of products of conception with inherent potentiality of humanity, should
not the criteria be rigidly restrictive rather than vague and expansive? It is one thing to balance a life for a life, but a life for a
little better health, a better car, or more bread on the table is
quite another matter. Since psychiatric indications now provide
the major stimulus for therapeutic abortion, what is the psychiatrict indication? Even the psychiatrists are not sure. Until recently, abortion statutes were phrased in terms allowing exceptions only in case of probable maternal suicide. But as previously
demonstrated statistically, that is an empty contention. The principal conditions in the psychiatric past that were regarded as indications for therapeutic abortion were acute schizophrenia, psychopathic personality, marked obsessive-compulsive neurosis with
With the marked
overwhelming anxiety, and severe depression.
advances in psychiatric technics, a keener realization by practicing obstetricians of the need and value of ego support during
pregnancy, and a vast improvement in exchange between the two
disciplines, a definite consensus has arisen. Eastman, in his obstetric forward to Rosen's book"9 on therapeutic abortion, capsulized past and present thinking on psychiatric indications:
By and large, obstetricians have performed therapeutic abortion on psychiatric indication begrudgingly. They
have been inclined to regard the indications which their
psychiatric colleagues bring to them as too esoteric and
intangible to be convincing ....

From the statements and

case histories which psychiatrists present in this volume,
it is clear that their opinion is veering rapidly toward
greater conservatism. The guilt complex which sometimes follows artificially produced abortion receives especial emphasis. Author after author use such phrases as
"the sense of guilt or inadequacy which appears directly
related to an abortion," "psychic hangover from an abortion," "the effect of the termination on the integrity of
the woman's personality structure," "emotional trauma
which the woman will subsequently experience." . . . The

feeling is growing apparently among the leaders in psychiatry that therapeutic abortion on psychiatric grounds
is often a double-edge sword and frequently carries with
it a degree of emotional trauma far exceeding that which
would 70have been sustained by continuation of the pregnancy.
This statement by the "dean" of obstetricians sets the present
tenor of thinking, but at the same time issues a severe challenge
68.

J. WruiAMs, supra note 66, at 368.

69. H. RosEN, TH E uTc ABORTION: MEDICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, LEGAL,
ANTHROPOLOGICAL, AND REmcious CONSIDERATIONS (Rosen ed. 1954).
70. N. Eastman, Obstetrical Forward to THERAPEUTICAL ABORTION:
MEDICAL, PsYcHIATRIc, LEGAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL, AND RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS at xix (Rosen ed. 1954).
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to both specialties. The easy way out of a dilemma, that is, recommendation and performance of a therapeutic abortion, has been
shown to be merely a superficial solution to often deep-seated
mental illness. Now psychiatrists are told to treat the illness as
they would in the non-gravida. Now the more difficult solution
to a vexing problem is proposed-a solution which bears rich fruita mother, treated by electroconvulsive, or psychotherapy, now
capable of dealing with her emotional conflicts, and a healthy infant as a reward. This approach, although requiring eminent
patience and more work, is a positive one; a therapeutic abortion
is negative. It leaves the gravida with her same underlying mental disease and as an ugly side effect has destroyed her fetus.
Significantly, psychiatrists in the past attempted, at least, to deal
with matters medical. Their recommendations and indications for
abortion had a medical tone. Today, it is commonly known among
medical men that psychiatrists are recommending the procedure
on para-medical grounds while phrasing their decision on psychiatric grounds. When this is so, the aborting physician not only
neglects to protect the unborn life which is his to protect, but he
becomes the unwitting instrument of its destruction. To advocate
a therapeutic abortion for schizophrenia is one thing, but to
advocate one because of the presence of a "stress situation" is quite
another. The latter term is meaningless and fully incapable of
definition. Dr. Theodore Lidz, professor of psychiatry at Yale
University School of Medicine, has stated:
Let us be frank about this. When the psychiatrist says
that there is a suicidal risk, in many instances he does not
mean that at all, but feels that there are strong socioeconomic grounds for a therapeutic abortion. Since the
only ground for abortion in many states is if it is felt there
is threat of death, suicidal risk is71thus established as the
only legal way out of the situation.
The psychiatrist is ill-equipped to make recommendations for therapeutic abortion on social and economic grounds. When the decision to abort involves social, economic, or so-called humanitarian
reasons, the physician has no place in the decision.7 2 A small committee of responsible citizens in the community should make the
decision. In this way society would take the responsibility for its
own pity and tenderness rather than the medical profession. There
is much to recommend this proposal. What training endows a
psychiatrist with the Solomon-like wisdom required to decide what
living standard a family should have and how much food should be
available to each of its members?
Notably, psychiatrists are concerned about this trend.73 The
language of the Model Penal Code reads "grave impairment of
71.
72.
73.

P. Harrington, Abortion, Part V., 34 LINAcRE Q. 158, 168 (1967).
See P. Harrington, Abortion, PartIV., 34 LINACRE Q. 67, 80 (1967).
See S. Bolter, supra note 54.
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mental or physical health."74 Any reasonable interpretation of
these words would seem to preclude social or economic indications
for therapeutic abortion. Would these words preclude therapeutic abortion on psychiatric indications? This is more of a problem,
involving the vague area of para-medical indications. The Code
writers recognized this problem by stating that psychiatric indications are difficult to classify and verify, and that "psychiatrists
have expressed concern at the shadowy line between psychiatric
and social justifications."7 5
THE EFFECT OF THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ON THE PSYCHE OF THE ABORTEE

If a physician is to recommend therapeutic abortion on psychiatric indications, what should he be forced to demonstrate? Williams 7 6 answers that he should be forced to show "imminent
danger of death of the mother as the result of the pregnancy, or
of great bodily or mental harm.7' 7 The corollary to Williams' directive is that if the therapeutic abortion is to be truly therapeutic,
the mother must be returned to a relative state of health afterwards. The therapeutic abortion should have a "therapeutic"
effect on her mental illness. It is often repeated that "pregnancy
and birth of the child do not influence adversely the course of
schizophrenia, manic-depressive illnesses, or the majority of the
psychoneuroses .... ,,71 Quite to the contrary, a considerable body
of respected medical opinion indicates that therapeutic abortion
itself is severe psychological trauma and may more severely damage
the psyche of the woman than would continuation of the pregnancy.79 Another group of physicians feels strongly that therapeutic abortion is not followed by untoward psychiatric sequelae.80
Examination of the medical literature leads to a full spectrum of
opinion with one group alleging psychiatric sequelae in a remarkable percentage of cases. 8'
Psychoanalysts feel that abortions are reacted to in different
ways depending on the mental makeup of the patient. 2 Some
74.

MODEL PENAL CODE Comment 3, at 152 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

75. Id.
76. J. WILLIAMs, supra note 66.
77. Id. at 1116.
78. A. Noyxs & L. KoLB, MoDERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 407 (6th ed.
1963).
79. See S. Bolter, supra note 54; R. Curran, The Quiet Murder, 33 LINACRE Q. 346 (1966); M. Ekblad, Induced Abortion on Psychiatric GroundsA Follow-Up Study of 479 Women, ACTA PSYCHIATRICA ET NEUROLOGICA
ScANDINIVICA 99 (Supp. 1955).

80. See Z. Leavy & J.Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship
and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 123 (1962); J.Kummer, Post-Abortion PsychiatricIllness-A Myth?, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 980 (1963).
81. See N. Simon & A. Senturia, Psychiatric Sequelae of Abortion, 15
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 378 (1966).
82. See 2. H. DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A PSYCHOANALYTIC
INTERPRETATiO N 179 (1945).
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exhibit a marked need to conceive. Their usual reaction after
abortion is severe neuroticism or a new pregnancy.8 3 Others, severely guilt ridden, use the abortion as an appropriate mechanism
for self-accusation. The post-abortee will have a recurrent preoccupation with the abortion and thoughts centering on a general
theme of guilt for allowing others to "kill" her infant.8 4 Of course,
the poorer the pre-abortion personality integration and ego structure, the more the event is apt to disturb the mental equilibrium,
even to psychotic proportions. Where once was respect and love
for the male partner, there often exists hate and disgust. Taussig,8 5 the first to write on the phenomenon of post-abortion psy-

chiatric sequelae, is usually quoted as warning of their occurrence.
His comments consisted generally of case histories, but no reported
incidence figures were given. Ekblad86 probably has the largest
statistical study of this phenomenon, which consisted of 479 women
who had legal abortions in Stockholm in 1949-50 for psychiatric
indications. The women were divided into two groups: normal,
average personalities (42%), and abnormal personalities (58%).
Most of the second group had chronic psychoneurotic symptoms.
At the follow-up interview, 64% had no reproach about the therapeutic abortion and 10% felt no reproach but did feel that the
operation was unpleasant. Mild reproach was experienced by
14% and serious reproach and regret by 11%.87 Ekblad concluded that the greater the psychiatric indications for legal abortion, the greater the risk of unfavorable sequelae.88 Two very
striking features in Ekblad's series seldom receive comment. First,
it is dangerous to draw binding conclusions based on the statistics
of his study because the abortees were Swedish. This means
that they were raised in a cultural milieu receptive to the phenomenon of therapeutic abortion and its need. One would anticipate a
much higher incidence of post-abortion guilt among American women aborted for psychiatric indications. American society has had
a much different outlook on therapeutic abortion and its need.
Abortion, by and large, never has been considered a socially accepted or adequate method of handling an unwanted pregnancy.
Even a so-called legal abortion is interpreted by most of society as
an unwelcome, unwholesome and unnatural solution to the problem of the unwanted pregnancy. This feeling is transmitted to
the abortee and is bound to create a higher incidence of postabortion guilt than in her Scandinavian counterpart. Ekblad's
series also contained a large percentage of single women, which
83. Id.
84. F. Ebaugh & K. Heuser, Psychiatric Aspects of Therapeutic Abortion, 2 POST. GRADUATE MEDICINE 325 (1947).
85. F. TAussIG, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL ASPECTS

86.
87.
88.

(1936).

N. Simon & A. Senturia, supra note 81.
Id. at 383.
Id.
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is also bound to affect his statistics. Many studies have illustrated significant differences in the post-abortion psyche of the
unwed mother as opposed to the married gravida. When the cultural environment is favorable for conception, birth and childrearing, as it is in marriage, there is usually a significantly higher
incidence of post-abortion guilt feelings. This again reflects the
impact of societies' unwritten standards on the psyche of the
mother. For single women, however, society sets a much less
stringent standard and is capable of infinitely more compassion
and understanding. This feeling, likewise, is transmitted to the
single woman and she is usually much less tormented by feelings
of guilt than is her married counterpart. Galdston said that an
adult woman who seeks an abortion "unless the warrant for it
is overwhelming, as in the case of rape or incest," is a sick person
in a sick situation and that neither the person nor the given
situation is likely to be remedied by the abortion. 9 Some relief
may be obtained, but in a number of instances, individuals and
situations are aggravated rather than remedied. 0 Whereas Lidz 91
considers abortion as a serious assault on the integrity of the body
and a tremendous threat to the integrity of the ego structure, 92
Kummer 93 concludes that most post-abortion psychiatric illness is
minor in degree and amount. Kummer feels that it is similar to
any other non-specific factor such as disappointment in love, loss
of one's job, or an accident. It is submitted that Dr. Lidz's analysis
of the event has more logic to recommend it. To equate the impact
of job loss or love disappointment with that of being a participant
in ending a life is difficult.
For the reader to draw meaningful conclusions from this maze
of medical dispute and contradiction, a primordial understanding
of the psychodynamics of pregnancy is vital. The single most
dominating psychiatric phenomenon associated with pregnancy is
ambivalence. "Ambivalence is a fundamental human trait which
makes it possible to love and hate the same person simultaneously,
to want and not to want a child at the same time. ' 94 When love
and desire predominate, as they do in emotionally healthy mothers, coexisting negative feelings hardly ever come to the surface. 5
The psyche of the mother can accept or reject the seed of pregnancy which has been sown. Pregnancy, however, is never accepted either psychologically or biologically with complete passivity.96 There are forces in the unconscious mind of each gravida
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

N. Simon & A. Senturia, supra note 81, at 385.
Id.
N. Simon & A. Senturia, supra note 81, at 382.
Id.
J. Kummer, Post-Abortion PsychiatricIllness-A Myth?, 119 Am.
J. PSYCHUATRY 980, 982 (1963).
94. J. Wl~Ams, supra note 66, at 364.
95. Id.
96. R. Curran, The Quiet Murder, 33 LINACRE Q. 344-45 (1966).
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which tend to complete the life-building process and other forces
at work to expel that life. 7 The psyche of the gravida in turn
affects the biological entity. Common signs and symptoms of
pregnancy, such as nausea, anorexia and vomiting, which are in
effect symptoms of a vastly altered maternal physiology, can be
greatly affected by mental forces. These mental forces use the
retentive and rejective powers of the body as their language of
ambivalence.98 This unconscious desire to expel must be hidden
by any legitimate reason for termination. When the unconscious
wish to expel reaches the acting out stage, guilt feelings begin to
appear with ever-increasing force in the maternal psyche.9 9 This
is a self-directed guilt which may arise whether the abortion is
performed in a licensed hospital, a back alley hovel, or at her own
hands.10 Once the gravida has decided to end the pregnancy,
another phenomenon enters the picture-fear. Fear is a common
and oft-described concomitant of the pregnancy state. These fears
are generally divided into two categories, which often run concurrently: fear for herself and fear for the baby. 101 The mother's
10 2
fears for herself assume both realistic and unrealistic proportions.
Realistically she fears possible death from the anesthesia, from
profuse hemorrhage, or fulminating sepsis. The unrealistic fears
spring from tremendous guilt feelings, from dreaded fear of punishment, and from a fear of death based on the notion that to
give a life is to lose one. 103 In creating life, and carrying it, she
must now sacrifice her own. For some women the need to punish
themselves is paramount. The guilt feelings which they carry as
a result of their decision can only be satisfied by deliberately
seeking the most dangerous ways to abort. 0 4 The act of abortion
solves nothing, for once it has been performed, the mind is
tortured anew. Ambivalence-a normal phenomenon in the psychodynamics of the gravida-has given way to conscious thought
10 5
and deliberation. These in turn have given way to action.
1 6
A variety of possible responses occur at this point.
For some,
there is only an unending sense of guilt. F
Iere is
tth,
anger, disappointment, and perhaps even hatred directed toward
those who played any significant part in the process. Still others
experience a new-found fear, a fear borne out of recognition of
this inner hostility capable of being acted upon to take a life.
A psychological cicatrix has now been entwined into the emo97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
R. Curran, supra note 96, at 346.
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tional makeup of an individual who has not attained a reasonably
mature ego. The gravida's concept of self or self-image in terms
of the ideal has been dealt a severe blow. 107 The guilt feelings
force her to repeatedly relive the fearsome event. At this point
the psyche's self-protecting mechanisms arising out of her ego rush
in to act as a repressive force. This is a defense mechanism, which
takes external effect in the form of a neurotic or sometimes psychotic reaction pattern. 08 Milder forms of these defense mechanisms are phobias, obsessive-compulsive reactions and conversion
reactions. 10 9 These ways of acting out the repressed event are
seldom new, but are rather like an anamnestic recall or an unconscious re-emergence of some prior action pattern. The woman
who tends to the compulsive will be even more fastidious in her
care of house and self. 10 The phobias are quite common. They
represent displaced fears against forbidden impulses. One often
finds a fear of knives, but they are placed out of the reach of the
potential murderess and not out of reach of the searching hands of
children. 1 ' The act of abortion has deep-seated ramifications during later pregnancies. The normal psychic phenomena of fear,
doubt and ambivalence this time weigh more heavily on the gravida.1 12 After all, she has been tested once before and has succumbed to the impulse to end her pregnancy. Her need for punishment is satisfied by a fanciful association of subsequent illnesses or accidents with her prior impropriety."1 Another crucial
test occurs at menopause. Even in the normal female this is a time
of marked physiological upheaval, and less often psychological upheaval. Her procreative days are forever behind her. The impact of this realization upon a psyche already guilt-ridden may
stir her now latent guilt feelings into new and fearsome expression. This is usually manifested by unusual feelings of guilt, tremendous despondency, talk of suicide and language of self-abasement.1 4 This, then, is a glimpse at the psychodynamics involved
when a gravida considers and ultimately acts out her decision to
terminate her pregnancy.
It would seem that any physician by the very nature of his
training would resist pressures to recommend therapeutic abortion. Common medical practice dictates that a procedure or
drug given to correct or avert a specific situation should not itself
be a stimulus to that situation. More specifically, in the practice
of psychiatry, recommendation of therapeutic abortion is one of the
few times when the psychiatrist deals with symptom management
107. Id.

108. Id.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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R. Curran, supra note 96, at 348.
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as a primary maneuver. 115 This, too, is foreign to the general
current in psychiatric treatment and it conflicts with definite trends
toward giving greater freedom to patients in their movements and
decisions. 116 Perhaps this is why Dr. Bolter 117 admonishes his
fellow psychiatrists not to take patients' statements at face value,
but rather to use their knowledge of psychodynamics to search the
unconscious reaches of the psyche. He urges them to look for
mental illness:
We have no business allowing our personal feelings about
the moral, social, or economic position of our patients to
influence our decision concerning therapeutic abortion.
The cases in which unfortunate circumstances have contributed to pregnancy are really few and far between. The
vast majority of requests for therapeutic abortion are
made of a psychiatrist by married women in families who
can well afford the children. Yet on first hearing the news
of pregnancy, they become upset and try
1 8 to influence
medical opinion to interrupt the pregnancy.
Bolter suggests that the psychiatric consultant should properly be
looking for contraindications to therapeutic abortion rather than
indications." 9
REASONS FOR LIBERALIZATION

Reasons propounded by advocates of abortion law reform
vary from country to country. In the United States, the arguments are twofold; one is charged with emotion and the other is
highly pragmatic. The most persistent and emotionally charged
reason centers on the stated high rate of maternal mortality. Proponents of reform argue that to allow 5,000 to 10,000 mothers to
perish in the prime of their lives is a heinous crime. Their contention is that by liberalizing the abortion laws, women will no
longer be driven to the back alley abortionist; abortions can then
be performed in the aseptic surroundings of the hospital operating
room by a man trained in the procedure. Since hemorrhage and
sepsis are the two leading post-abortion killers, the incidence of
these maternal complications could thereby be readily reduced.
This thinking has found its way into the Model Penal Code
Comments:
Proponents of liberalization would add that criminal
repression of abortions which are widely regarded as
permissible can only lead to the illicit performance of the
operation by quacks under conditions much more likely
to kill the mother. On this hypothesis, abortion laws
115. A. Rosenberg & E. Silver, Suicide, Psychiatrists and Therapeutic
Abortion, 102 CALiF. MAEDicNE 407 (1965).
116. Id.
117. S. Bolter, supra note 54, at 315.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
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purporting to be based on the
morality of saving life ac120
tually result in more deaths.
Superficially this argument has much to recommend it. Experience on the continent, however, where laws have been greatly
liberalized, does not support this theory. The first glaring shortcoming of this argument is that there is no consideration of fetal
life at all. The more therapeutic abortions done, the more fetal
deaths will result. Since the aim of modern obstetrical practice is
to achieve maximum health of mother and maximum safety of
fetus, this approach totally ignores one basic obstetrical aim. It
remains to examine the other basic aim-achieving maximum
maternal health. Authorities in both Sweden and Denmark reporting on their post-liberalization experience1 21 stated that the
number of legal abortions has increased from 500 to 5,000 per year
and that the number of illegal abortions, although difficult to
establish, was estimated at 12,000 per year. Sweden also has a very
high illegal abortion rate. Although some say the liberalization
process in Sweden has reduced the rate, others say that it has remained the same. 122 Several reasons have been advanced for
this failure to decrease maternal mortality rates. One author
has suggested the possibility that the legislatures, by broadening
indications for the procedure, have transmitted a feeling to the
populace that there is no wrong in having an abortion.1 23 This in
turn has tended to create an "abortion mentality" in all women
who unexpectedly and to their dissatisfaction find themselves pregnant.124 Another reason suggested is that if physicians now feel
that they can work within the framework of the law, they will
follow it meticulously and a greater percentage of abortions will
be of the back alley variety.125 The more pragmatic approach to
the abortion problem is aimed at giving the medical profession
the dignity of operating within the legal framework instead of at
odds with it. Proponents state that no other criminal law in the
history of jurisprudence has been broken with such steadfast regularity and apparent scorn. They state that physicians act in derogation of the law, doing what they feel is medically right for the
patient; that prosecutors are loathe to move against a physician
who has performed a therapeutic abortion with consultation and in
a licensed hospital; and that juries will not convict. This behavioral
trend is then translated by proponents into a mandate for eradi120.
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Comment 1, at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 9,1959).

121. M. CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1958), quoting
Dr. Carl Clemmesen, consultant in psychiatry, National Health Service,
Copenhagen, Denmark.
122. Id. at 30, referring to Dr. Af Geijerstam, Department of Women's
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(1957).
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cating existing laws. Others have pointed out the fallacies in this
approach. 126 The same could be said for other aspects of social
behavior such as prostitution, speeding and cheating on one's income tax. Yet this hardly supports an argument for repeal of
these penal statutes. Whether evaded or not, these latter statutes
continue to serve a useful function in our society by condemning
immorality, promoting safety and welfare, and providing the means
to run our machinery of government.
If one were to attempt a liberalization of present abortion
statutes, however, what would be his objective? Here again there
are basically two approaches open to reformers. One approach,
taken nowhere but in Japan and iron curtain countries, is the
demand abortion. This approach allows the woman to be the
judge of her need for a therapeutic abortion. The obstetrician,
stripped of his medical and surgical judgment, acts merely as an
automaton to perform an ordered procedure. There are powerful
128
127
and the legal profession
voices in this country in the laity

who advocate this course. Leavy and Kummer state that "as long
as there are any restrictions at all, women with unwanted pregnancies who are determined to abort will seek out and find illegal
abortionists. 129 Demand abortion is bad morals, bad medicine,
and hence bad law. Demand abortion is bad medicine because it
takes a medical-surgical problem from the hands of one most
qualified and trained to handle it and places the ultimate decision
in the hands of one least qualified to make it. Medical and
surgical judgment must remain in medical and surgical hands.
To do otherwise would open the door to catastrophic results.
The operation of therapeutic abortion, whether done
vaginally or by abdominal hysterotomy, is not without
intrinsic danger. Therefore, in considering the justification for therapeutic abortion in a given case, it is not
enough reason that pregnancy will be harmful, but it must
be indisputably clear that the risks involved in the continuation of pregnancy are greater than the hazards of the
operative procedure. Since the patient is ordinarily a
sick woman, with perhaps advanced cardiac or hypertensive disease, these operative hazards may be substantial.
Indeed, even in normal, healthy women, the mortality and
morbidity rates of the operationare considerable.
This statement is documented by data from countries
in which therapeutic abortion is frequently induced for
eugenic or humanitarian reasons and hence performed for
the most part on women who are physically and mentally
normal. In 23,666 therapeutic abortions performed in Den126. A. Mietus & N. Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or
a Challenge to Society?, 51 A.B.A.J. 924 (1965).
127. See L. LADER, supra note 5.
128. See Z. Leavy & J. Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Law,
50 A.B.A.J. 52 (1964).
129. Id. at 55.
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mark, the mortality rate was 0.7 per 1000 operations while
serious but non-fatal sequelae ensued in 3.2%

....

These

sequelae included 82 cases of perforation of the uterus
and 122 cases of salpingitis, peritonitis and septicemia. In
addition, 113 cases of non-fatal but serious complications
followed 5,230 abdominal hysterotomies, or 2.1%.130
The other approach, followed by the Model Penal Code, is to
make present law fit present practice. The Code provides legal
sanction for therapeutic abortions for the following conditions:
(1) when the pregnant woman's physical or mental health
is gravely impaired;
(2) when the child is likely to be born with grave physical or mental defects;
(3) when the pregnancy is the result of rape, intercourse
with an underage female, or incest.13'
The Code gives legal sanction for present threats to the mother's
health, both mental and physical, though they must be grave. It
further gives full legal sanction to eugenic and humanitarian indications for therapeutic abortion. What is left? Proponents of
liberalization state that "the basic turning point in liberalization
must be in the exception for 'anticipated weakness' or otherwise
known as economic distress."' 18 2 They contend that proposals
extending grounds for therapeutic abortion, yet remaining consistent with the underlying rationale of the law, only slightly
ameliorate the present situation. 133 They feel that if economic
distress is the principle cause of abortion, then any exception for
economic reasons would render the law largely nugatory. 13 4 In
other words, until all laws permit demand abortions, existing
statutes will have very little effect on the problem. Their logic
may be irrefutable, but the solution they propose has neither medical nor moral foundation to support it.
CONCLUSION

Therapeutic abortion presents a most complex problem for
present day society. It demands an answer. The Model Penal
Code has proposed an adequate one, although in somewhat faltering and apologetic tones. Since the performance of a therapeutic abortion necessarily involves destruction of a life, there must
always be sufficient countervailing reasons in support of the decision. Medicine has struck from the list disease after disease as
indications for therapeutic abortion. Today, however, with modern
psychiatry forming a most respected, most valued, and most accessible role in American medicine, the psychiatrist is too often
acting as an unwitting accomplice in the needless destruction of
130.
131.
132.
133.

J. WnmiAMs, supranote 66, at 1116.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
See Note, 32 IND. L.J. 193, 201 n.49 (1956).
Id. at 205.

134. Id. at 201 n.49.
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potential offspring, One of the basic tenets of medicine is that the
cure should never be worse than the disease. Much psychiatric
thinking is that the guilt feelings created in the gravida, as a result of her consent to the destruction of the offspring which she
has had a part in creating, may cause a psychological cicatrix of
extensive proportions. These feelings of guilt arise because the
gravida never accepts the role of pregnancy with complete passivity. Ambivalence is present in her unconscious mind and affects
and is affected by her physiological processes. If the unconscious
mental forces seeking rejection of the fetus are transformed into
overt action, whether active procurement or passive submission,
whether in a back alley or spotless operating clinic, the guilt
will be the same. These guilt feelings may lead to profound
disturbance in mental equilibrium both at the time of the act and
later at menopause when psychologically the gravida's entire procreative life is reenacted for her. In light of these psychodynamics,
our psychiatric indications for therapeutic abortion should be scrutinized anew. Perhaps the cure has in fact been worse than the
disease. To be sure, fetal mortality is a guaranteed 100% and
perhaps the maternal morbidity is far greater and long lasting
than had been previously anticipated.
Proponents of liberalization say that it is a woman's ultimate
right and final freedom to control the use of her own body. This
writer concurs. But once she has used her body and the procreative powers contained therein to produce another life, she
should not be the sole and final arbiter. If indeed there are concrete medical, eugenic, psychiatric, or humanitarian indications for
performance of a therapeutic abortion, and there is a definite and
readily foreseeable good to be accomplished by it, medicine, society
and the law should say proceed. If the proposed indications for
therapeutic abortion are on economic or social grounds, indeed the
cure is far worse than the disease. Demand abortion is a solution
to nothing. It substitutes non-surgical thinking for what must always remain a surgical procedure. It runs the risk of creation
of grave psychiatric sequelae with little or no countervailing
good to be attained. No one's mental health will be improved
because none was impaired.
1
Mengert 35
said that "there will always be among us surgically
minded enthusiasts, who operate with more facility than they cerebrate."' 36 Wielding a curette is operating. Routine performance
of therapeutic abortions without intense scrutinization of the psychiatric indications shows a distinct lack of cerebration. A noble
profession and a trusting public deserve better.
DENNIS M. MAHONEY,

M.D.

135. W. Mengert, Current Trends in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 20 OBsETzics & GYNECOLOGY 923 (1962).

136. Id. at 924.

